Background. In 2015, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) was notified of an acute case of hepatitis C virus (HCV). The patient had no traditional HCV risk factors. The only known subcutaneous exposure was health care received at a pain management clinic.
Methods. Investigators utilized the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) viral hepatitis health care-associated infection investigation protocol to guide field investigation, assess risk to patients, perform patient notification, and test patients for blood-borne pathogens.
Results. The index case was found to be the final patient seen in the clinic's operating room for the week. Examining the MDHHS viral hepatitis registry revealed another acute HCV patient seen immediately before the index case. The second acute case was preceded by a patient chronically infected with HCV. Due to the possibility of patient-to-patient HCV transmission, 122 patients were recommended to be tested for blood-borne pathogens. Ninety-two patients presented for testing. No additional transmission events were discovered.
Conclusion. Health care-associated transmission of HCV likely occurred at an outpatient pain management clinic; possibly the result of multiple patient use of single-dose vials. Because no other cases were discovered this may represent an isolated incident as opposed to a systematic breakdown in infection control standards. This circumstanceIntroduction An estimated 2.5-4.7 million persons in the United States are infected with Hepatitis C Virus (HCV), making HCV the most common blood-borne infection in the country [1] . Long-term, chronic infection with HCV can lead to liver cirrhosis, liver disease, liver failure, hepatocellular carcinoma and in some instances death [2] [3] [4] [5] .
Although transmission of HCV in the health care environment in the United States is considered rare, recently there have been a growing number of health carerelated outbreaks associated with unsafe medical practices (e.g., reuse of syringes, drug diversion) [6] [7] [8] . Between 2008 and 2014 the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recorded 45 outbreaks of viral hepatitis related to health care [9] . During this time frame over 100,000 patients were notified to be screened for blood-borne pathogens and ultimately 414 were diagnosed with viral hepatitis. Because of the long incubation period (up to 6 months) and asymptomatic nature of viral hepatitis infections, these numbers are likely an underestimation of the number of viral hepatitis infections related to health care exposure.
Of the 45 outbreaks reported to CDC, 42 (95%) occurred in non-hospital settings. Regulatory oversight of outpatient areas is often not as strict as in acute care hospitals [10, 11] . In addition, the absence of dedicated infection control staff, resources, and training for personnel in outpatient areas may increase the likelihood of errors in aseptic technique, standard precautions, and general infection control practices. This is exacerbated by changes in health care delivery in the United States. There are more outpatient encounters in the US than ever before, with increasingly invasive procedures being performed [12, 13] . Injectable narcotics, in particular, are commonplace in outpatient clinics and, in an era of drug shortages, are often utilized in manners inconsistent with best-practice standards [14, 15] .
Here we report the field investigation of a free-standing outpatient pain management clinic thought to be associated with HCV infections related to unsafe medical care.
Methods
In February of 2015, Patient A notified the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) that she was diagnosed with acute HCV infection and that it may be related to health care procedures she received. In such situations the MDHHS utilizes CDC's Viral Hepatitis Healthcare Investigation Guide to determine plausibility of transmission in the health care environment [16] . If transmission is suspected, a risk assessment is conducted to determine the extent of risk to additional patients. If warranted, the CDC Patient Notification Toolkit is used to notify patients of their potential risk and inform them to be tested for blood-borne pathogens [17] . potentially associated with health care visits in the same geographic region. A joint State-LHD site visit was conducted to review infection control policies, procedures, logs, and protocols, observe clinical practices at the clinic, and obtain medical records and lists of other patients seen during the potential HCV acquisition window. Patients determined to be potentially at risk were sent a letter informing them of the situation and recommending they be tested for HIV, hepatitis B virus (HBV), and HCV at a local health care system. Isolates testing positive for HCV antibody were automatically reflexed to an HCV RNA test. Isolates that were positive for HCV RNA underwent genotype testing. Additional visits to the clinic were conducted to update clinic staff on the investigation, the results of testing and to reassess clinical practices and infection control policies and procedures.
Results

Verify the Acute Diagnosis
Patient A, who had no known history of HCV infection, was hospitalized in October 2014 for acute hepatitis. During this hospital stay Patient A tested positive for HCV antibody and HCV RNA, had an ALT level over 1,000, and experienced discrete onset of abdominal pain, fatigue, fever, vomiting, loss of appetite, and jaundice. Patient A was also negative for Hepatitis A IgG and IgM and Hepatitis B surface antigen. A liver CT and biopsy at the time of hospitalization did not show evidence of chronic liver damage. Patient A, therefore, met clinical and surveillance criteria for acute HCV infection. The exposure window for HCV is generally 2 weeks to 6 months prior to symptom onset making it likely that Patient A was infected with HCV between April and September of 2014 [18] . Patient A did make a full recovery and was discharged from the hospital but developed chronic HCV infection with HCV genotype 1b.
Assess Overall Exposure History
Patient A was interviewed regarding her medical and social history and gave consent for the State to obtain her full medical records. Patient A was a good historian and despite a complicated medical history, had few health care visits during the possible exposure window. Patient A did not identify any traditional HCV risk factors (e.g., injection drug use, incarceration, tattooing).
Assess Health Care Encounters and Look for Additional Cases
Between April and September of 2014, Patient A had three medical visits where subcutaneous procedures were performed, all at a free-standing pain management facility (Clinic A). Due to Patient A's previous medical history and procedures, she was in chronic pain and visiting a pain management specialist. Patient A had an indwelling intrathecal pump which was reprogrammed at Clinic A in July 2014 and refilled in August 2014.
Pain Clinic Hepatitis C Virus Transmission
Patient A also received a facet joint block injection in August 2014.
Clinic A is not regulated by the MDHHS Licensing and Regulatory Affairs (LARA) health care facilities group. The licensing of the clinic lies solely on the physician's license. Contacts at LARA informed MDHHS investigators that the facility and the clinicians at Clinic A have had no complaints on their licenses. A review of acute hepatitis B and C cases reported to the MDSS from 2014 to present did not identify any cases directly linked to Clinic A.
Site Visit Summary
MDHHS and LHD investigators decided that an unannounced site visit to the clinic was prudent given the circumstances. In March 2015, the LHD was able to obtain an affidavit to investigate the possibility that Patient A acquired her HCV infection during one of her clinic procedures and to assess the potential risk to others seen at the clinic.
Clinic A was staffed by one physician, one registered nurse (RN), and five medical assistants (MAs). The small clinic has one operating room (OR), where patients were seen one-at-a-time. There are three pre-operative and three post-operative spaces where patients are prepped and recover from procedures. On a given day, one MA staffs the pre-op area, one MA staffs the post-op area, and one works in the OR with the physician and RN. Two other MAs would handle any clerical duties. The types of procedures conducted in the clinic can be found in Table 1 . Procedures were conducted in the morning, 4 days per week, with approximately 15-20 patients seen in the OR each day. Infusion pump refills were performed in the post-op area in the afternoons. No clinic staff were reported to MDSS with HCV infection. Therefore, the investigation focused mainly on the possibility of patient-to-patient transmission.
The clinic did not have any written infection control policies and procedures. In addition, staff were not trained in infection prevention annually or on hire. Documentation such as autoclave logs, controlled substance counts, and medical wasting logs were not kept. A list of controlled substances commonly utilized in the clinic can be found in Table 1 . These medications are kept in a locked cabinet in the OR, which is only accessible by the physician and RN.
With the exception of intravenous (IV) starts and pump refills, all invasive procedures were conducted within the OR by the physician and RN. MAs would insert an IV catheter for IV access pre-operatively. This IV catheter was not flushed with saline or heparin after insertion nor was IV solution used to maintain IV access. During OR observations it was noted that most medications were single-dose vials, with the exception of fentanyl which came in a 5 mL single-use ampule. Investigators never noticed needles or syringes being used on more than one patient; however, during one procedure investigators did observe the same needle and syringe being used to re-dose a patient with fentanyl. Two mL of fentanyl were given to a patient and then the same needle and syringe were used to give a second 2 mL dose. The remaining fentanyl in the 5 mL vial was discarded and not used on subsequent patients. At the time of our site visit, fentanyl was occasionally used for patient sedation due to propofol drug shortages. During the time when Patient A was seen at the clinic, sedation was performed primarily with propofol. Medication ordering history from the clinic indicated that the clinic was ordering 20 mL single-use vials of propofol. Records determined that a patient typically received between 1 mL and 4 mL of propofol. Despite its label as a single-use vial, there were enough doses for 5-20 patients.
We obtained a list of patients who were seen in the OR or had a pump refill on the same service date as Patient A to determine if we could identify a potential source of Patient A's infection. These patients were then matched on name and date of birth to cases of HCV reported through the MDSS. Of the 80 patients seen on the same service dates as Patient A during her potential HCV acquisition window, only one was reported with chronic HCV infection (Patient B) and one diagnosed with acute HCV infection (Patient C). Oddly enough, Patients B, C, and A were seen back-to-back-to-back in the OR, in that order, on the same day. Patient B had a bilateral epidural injection and Patient C had bilateral hip injections. All patients received lidocaine, marcaine, versed, fentanyl, and propofol. Patients C and A both were infected with genotype 1b, which infects approximately 25% of all persons with HCV in the United States [19] . It was later discovered that patient B was also infected with HCV genotype 1b.
Like Patient A, Patient C was also hospitalized with acute HCV infection in October of 2014, tested positive for both HCV antibody and HCV RNA, had ALTs over 1,000, and tested negative for Hepatitis A IgM and Hepatitis B surface antigen. Interviews with Patient C did identify other medical procedures during the patient's potential exposure window, but the temporality of the three HCV infections seemed more than coincidental. The working hypothesis was that Patient B (chronically infected with HCV) was the source of the HCV infection for down-stream patients C and A (both who presented with acute infection). The theorized mode of transmission was the 20 mL vial of propofol. If the clinicians had used the same needle and syringe to redose Patient B, the large propofol vial could have been inoculated with HCV. The vial may then have been used on patients C and A, exposing them to propofol contaminated with Patient B's blood (Figure 1 ).
Patient Notification and Testing
Evidence gathered through the investigation and site visit identified a potential for health care transmission of HCV at the clinic. In these instances, it is public health's responsibility to notify patients of their potential risk. The hypothesized transmission from Patient B to C to A may have only been an isolated incident or it could have been indicative of a larger infection control lapse. As such, it was determined to start by notifying all patients seen in the OR at Clinic A from the week prior to the possible transmission of HCV to the those seen in the OR the week after. In total, 122 patients received letters from the clinic urging them to be tested for HBV, HCV, and HIV. A lab slip for testing was included in the letter along with a list of locations where patients could be tested at no charge to them. 
Testing Results
Ninety
Discussion
This investigation describes a cluster of HCV cases that are likely related to unsafe injection and vial handling practices at a free-standing outpatient pain management clinic. There are several factors which lead us to believe that care received at Clinic A was the route of HCV acquisition for two patients: 1) investigators observed clinicians re-using a needle and syringe to redose a patient in the OR; 2) vials of propofol (though labeled as single use) used at the time of the potential exposure(s) could have been used on as many as 20 patients; 3) a known chronically infected HCV case was seen immediately prior to two downstream patients that both presented with acute HCV infection; 4) both acute patients presented with acute HCV at the same time and had no or few other HCV risk factors; and 5)
Patients A-C all tested positive for HCV genotype 1b. Identification of a single acute case of HCV is fairly rare. Identification of two acute HCV cases seen at the same clinic on the same day on back-to-back appointments Coyle et al.
during the window period of acquisition is exceptionally coincidental. Fortunately, evidence of additional bloodborne pathogen transmission events was not discovered. We believe, therefore, that this may have been an isolated incident and not indicative of a systemic breakdown in infection control. Patients A, B, and C were the last three patients seen in the OR for the week, which may have limited exposure to other patients.
Coordination between State and LHD investigators and cooperation of the clinic and the clinic's staff was critical. All parties understood that the investigation was never about assigning blame, but assessing risk to the public's health. Organization of patient testing through a local health system (at no charge to the patient), with samples being sent to CDC via the State of Michigan Laboratory, also proved successful. Of the 122 patients deemed potentially exposed, we obtained evidence that 75% pursued HBV, HCV, and HIV testing. This is a similar proportion than has been reported in other health care associated viral hepatitis investigations [20] [21] [22] . This situation underscores the need to adhere to CDC's Minimum Expectations for Safe Care in Outpatient Settings, particularly related to syringe and vial usage (Table 2 ) [14] . In this particular instance, a used needle and syringe should never be used to access a medication vial (even for the same patient) and single dose or single use vials should not be used on multiple patients. Since the investigation, the pain management clinic has taken major steps to improving patient safety. The clinic has hired an infection control consultant, developed infection control policies and procedures, requires staff to take infection control training annually and on hire, and has log books to track equipment disinfection, medication counts, and medication wasting. The clinic is exploring the possibility of purchasing smaller vials of medication and has taken steps to assure that a new needle and syringe is used for each injection (even if it's for the same patient).
Conclusion
We conclude that a 20 mL single-use vial of propofol was likely inoculated with HCV genotype 1b when a chronically infected patient was re-dosed using the same needle and syringe. The vial of propofol was used on two subsequent patients who both presented with genotype 1b acute HCV infection. This scenario Pain Clinic Hepatitis C Virus Transmission highlights the need for strict observance and practice of CDC's Minimum Expectations for Safe Care in Outpatient Facilities to protect the health and safety of patients [14] .
